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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020814-CA

v.
MARK DOUGLAS PRIDEAUX,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of one count each of
criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony, and possession,
purchase, transfer, or ownership of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, a second degree felony (R. 2-4).

This court

has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to the pourover
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1999) (R. 332).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance of

counsel by eliciting testimony that defendant was on parole at
the time he shot the victim, where that testimony served a valid
tactical purpose?
2.

Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance of

counsel where, at the close of the State's evidence, when the

record contained competent evidence of all elements of possession
or use of a firearm by a restricted person, defense counsel did
not move for a directed verdict?
In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance
prejudiced defendant.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991).
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed on the record of
the underlying trial.

See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,

M

16-17, 12 P.3d 92.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 2000), governing
possession of dangerous weapons by certain persons, provides in
relevant part:
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A Category I restricted person is a
person who:
(ii) is on probation or parole for any
felony[.]
(2) A Category I restricted person who
purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or
otherwise has under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second
degree felony[.]

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of murder, a first
degree felony, and possession, purchase, transfer, or ownership
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree
felony (R. 2-4). After a preliminary hearing, defendant was
bound over for trial (R. 49). A jury convicted him as charged
(R. 266-67).

The trial court sentenced defendant to five years

to life in the Utah State Prison on the first degree felony and
one to fifteen years on the second degree felony (R, 299-301).
The court ordered the terms to run consecutively to each other
and to the term defendant was currently serving (Id.).

The court

also denied credit for time served, ordered restitution of
$6886.43 to the victim's family, and imposed a fine of $5550 plus
interest (Id.).

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R.

303-04).
Nine months later, defendant filed a motion for a rule 23B
remand on the ground that counsel had failed to investigate and
call a witness.

This Court granted a remand to develop a record

on the allegation (R. 354-68, 360).

Following a hearing, the

trial court determined that defense counsel had not rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel on that claim (R. 413-17).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

An Underlying

Tension

Vanessa Martinez was pregnant with Christopher Velasquez's
son when she had a brief romantic relationship with defendant (R.
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338: 369). Two or three weeks prior to the events giving rise to
this case, she told Christopher about the affair.

The baby was

almost five months old at the time (Id. at 278, 369).
Christopher confronted defendant, the two had a verbal fight, and
then, the matter seemingly resolved, the two went off drinking
together (R. 338: 371; R. 339: 427).

Christopher1s

Birthday

Party

Christopher Velasquez, the victim, celebrated his birthday
on January 12, 2001, by hosting a party for his friends, most of
whom were members of a gang called VLT (R. 337: 140, 182).
Quantities of beer and methamphetamine were consumed at the party
(Id^ at 161, 185; R. 339: 415, 418, 438, 485-86, 497).

Several

partygoers packed handguns (R. 337: 134, 139, 177, 179, 188, 219
R. 338: 240, 281; R. 339: 417).

Sometime after midnight, eight

or nine members of a gang called Dope Boy Posse showed up at the
party (R. 337: 133). An altercation broke out between members of
the two gangs, and guns were drawn (Id. at 218; R. 338: 240, 281;
R. 339: 416, 489). One witness testified that Christopher
announced, "You guys can't do this here.

This is my son's house

. . . Go outside" (R. 338: 282). The disputants went outside.
As the Dope Boy Posse members left the scene, they fired shots
from the street (R. 337: 140-41, 187). VLT returned fire (R. 337
at 187).
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Seeking

Revenge

Seeking revenge, the VLT members, including both Christopher
and defendant, piled out of the apartment and into their waiting
vehicles and set off in search of the Dope Boy Posse (R. 337:
145, 167, 190; R. 339: 418). After about an hour of unsuccessful
searching, with cell phone calls going back and forth between the
VLT members, the three vehicles all met briefly at a Food-4-Less
parking lot in West Valley City (R. 337: 143, 145, 147, 190; R.
339: 421). Defendant was driving an SUV; Christopher was sitting
in the back seat (R. 337: 145, 189). The three vehicles then
proceeded to a dead end street, where two VLT members got out "to
use the bathroom" (R. 337: 151-52, 192, R. 339: 424). One
immediately returned to his seat in the back of a van, while the
other remained outside, standing between the van and a white
Thunderbird (R. 337: 192-93).

Adrenalin was running high (R.

338: 239).

The

Shooting

Christopher and defendant got out of the SUV (R. 337: 151,
153-54, 192; R. 339: 424).

Defendant was talking to Christopher,

who was holding his hands up, palms out in front of him as if to
catch something (R. 337: 193, R. 339: 425). One witness, sitting
in the Thunderbird, testified that Christopher''s stance suggested
to him that
425).

>N

they were going to get in a boxing match" (R. 339:

He further testified: "[I]t looked like they were going to

fight and they were walking towards each other.
-5-

So I looked

over.

And as I did that, I saw [defendant] step back a little

bit and pull out a gun" (Id. at 426).
Two other witnesses corroborated that it was defendant who
was holding the gun when the shots that killed Christopher were
fired (R. 337: 155, 179, 197). l

The first shot hit Christopher

in the wrist, shattering his watch, and then entered his chest,
damaging his heart and lung (R. 338: 346-47; R. 339: 426, 428).
Three more shots quickly followed (R. 337: 194). 2

Christopher

began to run away, stumbled, got up, and staggered to a nearby
home.

After pounding once on the front door, Christopher

collapsed on the porch.

He died where he fell, of multiple

gunshot wounds to the chest, left arm, and hip (R. 337: 155, 195,
201; R. 338: 258, 263, 266, 356; R. 339: 428-29).
Defendant returned to his vehicle and fled the scene of the
murder.

The other two vehicles and their occupants also

immediately drove off (R. 339: 429).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective because he
elicited testimony from a detective that defendant was on parole

1

The only other person out of a vehicle when the shooting
occurred did not have a gun and was "using the bathroom" at the
time. His cousin quickly jumped out of the van to haul him to
safety (R. 337: 195, 197)
2

Detectives found four 9mm casings on the scene (R. 338:
298). One witness to the shooting also testified that he saw
defendant at the birthday party with a 9mm "baby Glock" handgun
(R. 339: 416-17).
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at the time he murdered Christopher Velasquez.

Absent this

testimony, he asserts the evidence would have been insufficient
to convict him of possession or use of a firearm by a restricted
person.

This argument fails on the deficient performance prong

of the ineffectiveness test because his counsel had a sound
strategic reason, related to the pending first degree murder
charge, for introducing the testimony.
Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to move for a directed verdict on the possession of a
firearm charge.

He contends that the detective's testimony was

inadmissible because it was not the "best evidence" of
defendant's status as a parolee.

Absent a written document, he

contends the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction
for possession or use of a firearm by a restricted person.
Defendant cites to no rule of evidence to support this
proposition.

In any event, the detective's testimony that

defendant was on parole at the time of the murder, combined with
documentary proof of a 1995 felony conviction, provided the jury
with a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that defendant was
a restricted person within the meaning of the applicable statute.
No more was necessary to survive a directed verdict.

Because

failure of counsel to make a futile objection cannot constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant's claim fails.
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
WHEN HE ELICITED TESTIMONY THAT
DEFENDANT WAS ON PAROLE AT THE TIME
HE SHOT CHRISTOPHER VELASQUEZ
BECAUSE THAT TESTIMONY SERVED A
VALID TACTICAL PURPOSE
On appeal, defendant has abandoned the ineffective
assistance claim that he asserted in his rule 23B motion.
Instead, he argues that his trial counsel performed deficiently
because, lacking any valid purpose, he elicited a statement from
a detective that defendant was on parole at the time he shot
Christopher Velasquez (Br. of Aplt. at 8-9).

Defendant argues

that he was prejudiced because, absent the testimony, no evidence
would have established that he was a "category I restricted
person/' a necessary element of the statute forbidding a
restricted person from possessing or using a firearm.
Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (a).

See Utah

Thus, absent the testimony, he

argues, the evidence would have been insufficient as a matter of
law to support a conviction for possession or use of a firearm by
a restricted person (Br. of Aplt. at 9 ) . 3
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was so
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of

3

Defendant's appeal challenges only his second degree
felony conviction for possession or use of a firearm. He nowhere
contests the correctness of his conviction for murder.
-8-

reasonableness and that, but for the deficient performance, a
reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial
would have been different.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 694 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah
1990).

Defendant's claim fails on the deficient performance

prong of the ineffectiveness test.
When reviewing trial counsel's work to assess deficient
performance, "a[n appellate] court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance."

State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d

681, 685 (Utah 1997)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

"If a

rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated [this
Court] will assume counsel acted competently."
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993).

State v.
Thus, "an

ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable
legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's
actions."

Id.

Here, defense counsel's questioning arose in a context that
bespeaks a rational trial strategy.

The State had called Troy

Johnson, a West Valley City homicide detective, to testify.

On

direct examination, Johnson described interviewing defendant two
days after the murder (R. 338: 376). Meeting with defendant, who
had been arrested and held in Logan, Johnson asked him his name.
Defendant replied, "William Taylor" (Id. at 377).

Following a

Miranda warning, Johnson questioned defendant about his name.
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In

response, defendant inquired who the detective thought he was.
When Johnson surmised he was Mark Prideaux, defendant admitted
his identity (Id. at 378).

Defendant also stated that although

he attended Christopher's birthday party, he left immediately
after shots were exchanged with the rival gang members and went
to Ogden (Id. at 37 9).

He denied being part of the group that

searched for the Dope Boy Posse (Id.).
On cross examination, seeking to dispel the inference that
defendant gave a false name to the officer in order to avoid
apprehension for the murder of Christopher Velasquez, defense
counsel elicited an alternative explanation for defendant's
behavior.

Through a series of leading questions, counsel

established that defendant had been on parole for a narcotics
conviction, that he had absconded, and that Adult Probation and
Parole had issued a warrant for his arrest (Id. at 383). This
information gave the jury a basis upon which to believe both that
defendant had nothing to do with Christopher's murder and that
defendant had an entirely independent motive to lie to the police
about his identity.

Thus, by eliciting information about

defendant's parole status and, in the process, admitting to an
element of a second degree felony, defense counsel attempted to
render acquittal of the more serious, first degree felony more
likely.

Such a decision reflects sound trial strategy, which

this Court should not second-guess on appeal.
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See Taylor, 947

P.2d at 685; Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468.

Defendant, therefore,

has not demonstrated that his counsel performed deficiently.
Moreover, defendant also has not demonstrated any prejudice
flowing from his counsel's eliciting his status as a parolee.
"To show prejudice under the second component of the
[ineffectiveness] test, a defendant must proffer sufficient
evidence to support ^a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.'"

Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,

522 (Utah 1994)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Here, defendant erroneously assumes that had he not elicited
defendant's status as a parolee, the State would not have
subsequently introduced such evidence.4
contrary.

The record speaks to the

On redirect examination, immediately after defense

counsel elicited testimony of defendant's parole status, the
State offered defendant's conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree
felony (Id. at 385; R. 232 at addendum A ) .

The State plainly

offered this exhibit as foundation for the testimony that
defendant had just introduced.

Had defendant not first

introduced testimony of his parole status for an independent
strategic reason, the State was certainly prepared to do so for
reasons of its own.

Where defendant himself negated the need for

4

Defendant does not contest that he was on parole at the
time, but only that the State should have borne the burden of
adducing that fact.
-11-

the State to produce the evidence by adducing it first himself,
he cannot now be heard to complain that the State did not carry
its burden.

More importantly, he has failed to show that the

State would not have adduced the evidence of his parole status if
he had not done it first.

Defendant, therefore, has not met his

burden of demonstrating prejudice.

For this additional reason,

his ineffective assistance claim fails.
POINT TWO
COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT
MOVING FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE
CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE BECAUSE AT
THAT JUNCTURE THE RECORD CONTAINED
COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF ALL ELEMENTS OF
POSSESSION OR USE OF A FIREARM BY A
RESTRICTED PERSON
Defendant also argues that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by not moving for a directed verdict at the close of
the State's evidence (Br. of Aplt. at 9 ) . He contends that the
detective's testimony that defendant was on parole was
inadmissible because it was not the "best evidence" of
defendant's status as a parolee (Id. at 9-10).

Absent a written

document attesting to defendant's parole status, he asserts that
the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for
possession or use of a firearm by a restricted person (Id. at
10) .
Defendant does not cite to any provision of the Utah Rules
of Evidence to support his contention that the detective's
testimony was inadmissible.

Instead, he relies wholly on a case

-12-

decided under rules of evidence not argued or applicable here.
See State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Utah 1977) (decided
under old Utah Rules of Evidence 20 and 21). Even assuming
arguendo, as stated in Peterson, that u[t]he best evidence of a
conviction of a crime is the record of that conviction, and not
by recollection testimony," id. (footnote omitted), it does not
follow that defendant's parole status can only

be proven by a

written document attesting to that fact.
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction "[wjhere
there is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can
be drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements of the
crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt."
789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989).

State v. Gardner,

A reviewing court will reverse a

criminal conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the
evidence is so lacking that "reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt" that defendant committed the
crime.

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983),

superceded on other grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah
1987).
Here, defendant himself, for strategic purposes, adduced
testimonial evidence that he was on parole for a felony (Id. at
383).

The State bolstered that testimony by introducing the

underlying documentary evidence that defendant had been convicted
of a felony in 1995 (R. 338: 385). With this record evidence
before it, the jury, as exclusive judge of both the weight of the
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evidence and its credibility, could reasonably believe that
defendant was on parole at the time of the murder and, therefore,
qualified as a Category I restricted person within the meaning of
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503 (2) (e) .

State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981,

984 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted) .

Thus, had defendant moved

for directed verdict, it would have been denied.
well-settled that

The law is

NN>

the failure of counsel to make motions or

objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.'"

Codianna v. Morris, 660

P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983)(quoting State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d
56, 58 (Utah 1982)).

Because defense counsel did not perform

deficiently by not moving for directed verdict and because
defendant has not shown that he would have prevailed on the
motion, his ineffectiveness claim fails.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this cx{? day of August, 2004.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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